Conflicts with native asn1.c
This commit is contained in:
Michael Brown
parent
b7ccdb7948
commit
ff84a66c35
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@ -1,867 +0,0 @@
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/*
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* Copyright(C) 2006 Cameron Rich
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*
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* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
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* along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*/
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/**
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* @file asn1.c
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*
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* Some primitive asn methods for extraction rsa modulus information. It also
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* is used for retrieving information from X.509 certificates.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include "crypto.h"
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#define SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE 8
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#define SIG_TYPE_MD2 0x02
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#define SIG_TYPE_MD5 0x04
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#define SIG_TYPE_SHA1 0x05
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/* Must be an RSA algorithm with either SHA1 or MD5 for verifying to work */
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static const uint8_t sig_oid_prefix[SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE] =
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{
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0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01
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};
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/* CN, O, OU */
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static const uint8_t g_dn_types[] = { 3, 10, 11 };
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static int get_asn1_length(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset)
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{
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int len, i;
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if (!(buf[*offset] & 0x80)) /* short form */
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{
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len = buf[(*offset)++];
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}
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else /* long form */
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{
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int length_bytes = buf[(*offset)++]&0x7f;
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len = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < length_bytes; i++)
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{
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len <<= 8;
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len += buf[(*offset)++];
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}
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}
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return len;
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}
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/**
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* Skip the ASN1.1 object type and its length. Get ready to read the object's
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* data.
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*/
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int asn1_next_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type)
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{
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if (buf[*offset] != obj_type)
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return X509_NOT_OK;
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(*offset)++;
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return get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
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}
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/**
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* Skip over an ASN.1 object type completely. Get ready to read the next
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* object.
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*/
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int asn1_skip_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type)
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{
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int len;
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if (buf[*offset] != obj_type)
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return X509_NOT_OK;
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(*offset)++;
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len = get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
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*offset += len;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Read an integer value for ASN.1 data
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* Note: This function allocates memory which must be freed by the user.
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*/
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int asn1_get_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint8_t **object)
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{
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int len;
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if ((len = asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_INTEGER)) < 0)
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goto end_int_array;
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*object = (uint8_t *)malloc(len);
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memcpy(*object, &buf[*offset], len);
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*offset += len;
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end_int_array:
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return len;
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}
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#if 0
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/**
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* Get all the RSA private key specifics from an ASN.1 encoded file
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*/
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int asn1_get_private_key(const uint8_t *buf, int len, RSA_CTX **rsa_ctx)
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{
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int offset = 7;
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uint8_t *modulus, *priv_exp, *pub_exp;
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int mod_len, priv_len, pub_len;
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#ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_CRT
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uint8_t *p, *q, *dP, *dQ, *qInv;
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int p_len, q_len, dP_len, dQ_len, qInv_len;
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#endif
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/* not in der format */
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if (buf[0] != ASN1_SEQUENCE) /* basic sanity check */
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
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printf("Error: This is not a valid ASN.1 file\n");
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#endif
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return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
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}
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/* initialise the RNG */
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RNG_initialize(buf, len);
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mod_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &modulus);
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pub_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &pub_exp);
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priv_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &priv_exp);
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if (mod_len <= 0 || pub_len <= 0 || priv_len <= 0)
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return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
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#ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_CRT
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p_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &p);
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q_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &q);
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dP_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &dP);
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dQ_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &dQ);
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qInv_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &qInv);
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if (p_len <= 0 || q_len <= 0 || dP_len <= 0 || dQ_len <= 0 || qInv_len <= 0)
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return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
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RSA_priv_key_new(rsa_ctx,
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modulus, mod_len, pub_exp, pub_len, priv_exp, priv_len,
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p, p_len, q, p_len, dP, dP_len, dQ, dQ_len, qInv, qInv_len);
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free(p);
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free(q);
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free(dP);
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free(dQ);
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free(qInv);
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#else
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RSA_priv_key_new(rsa_ctx,
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modulus, mod_len, pub_exp, pub_len, priv_exp, priv_len);
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#endif
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free(modulus);
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free(priv_exp);
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free(pub_exp);
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return X509_OK;
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}
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/**
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* Get the time of a certificate. Ignore hours/minutes/seconds.
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*/
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static int asn1_get_utc_time(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, time_t *t)
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{
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int ret = X509_NOT_OK, len, t_offset;
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struct tm tm;
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if (buf[(*offset)++] != ASN1_UTC_TIME)
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goto end_utc_time;
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len = get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
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t_offset = *offset;
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memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(struct tm));
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tm.tm_year = (buf[t_offset] - '0')*10 + (buf[t_offset+1] - '0');
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if (tm.tm_year <= 50) /* 1951-2050 thing */
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{
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tm.tm_year += 100;
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}
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tm.tm_mon = (buf[t_offset+2] - '0')*10 + (buf[t_offset+3] - '0') - 1;
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tm.tm_mday = (buf[t_offset+4] - '0')*10 + (buf[t_offset+5] - '0');
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*t = mktime(&tm);
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*offset += len;
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ret = X509_OK;
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end_utc_time:
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* Get the version type of a certificate (which we don't actually care about)
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*/
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static int asn1_version(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
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{
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int ret = X509_NOT_OK;
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(*offset) += 2; /* get past explicit tag */
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if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_INTEGER))
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goto end_version;
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ret = X509_OK;
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end_version:
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* Retrieve the notbefore and notafter certificate times.
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*/
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static int asn1_validity(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
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{
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return (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
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asn1_get_utc_time(cert, offset, &x509_ctx->not_before) ||
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asn1_get_utc_time(cert, offset, &x509_ctx->not_after));
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}
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/**
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* Get the components of a distinguished name
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*/
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static int asn1_get_oid_x520(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset)
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{
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int dn_type = 0;
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int len;
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if ((len = asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_OID)) < 0)
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goto end_oid;
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/* expect a sequence of 2.5.4.[x] where x is a one of distinguished name
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components we are interested in. */
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if (len == 3 && buf[(*offset)++] == 0x55 && buf[(*offset)++] == 0x04)
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dn_type = buf[(*offset)++];
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else
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{
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*offset += len; /* skip over it */
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}
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end_oid:
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return dn_type;
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}
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/**
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* Obtain an ASN.1 printable string type.
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*/
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static int asn1_get_printable_str(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, char **str)
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{
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int len = X509_NOT_OK;
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/* some certs have this awful crud in them for some reason */
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if (buf[*offset] != ASN1_PRINTABLE_STR &&
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buf[*offset] != ASN1_TELETEX_STR && buf[*offset] != ASN1_IA5_STR)
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goto end_pnt_str;
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(*offset)++;
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len = get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
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*str = (char *)malloc(len+1); /* allow for null */
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memcpy(*str, &buf[*offset], len);
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(*str)[len] = 0; /* null terminate */
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*offset += len;
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end_pnt_str:
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return len;
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}
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/**
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* Get the subject name (or the issuer) of a certificate.
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*/
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static int asn1_name(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, char *dn[])
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{
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int ret = X509_NOT_OK;
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int dn_type;
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char *tmp = NULL;
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if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
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goto end_name;
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while (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SET) >= 0)
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{
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int i, found = 0;
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if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
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(dn_type = asn1_get_oid_x520(cert, offset)) < 0)
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goto end_name;
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if (asn1_get_printable_str(cert, offset, &tmp) < 0)
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{
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free(tmp);
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goto end_name;
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}
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/* find the distinguished named type */
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for (i = 0; i < X509_NUM_DN_TYPES; i++)
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{
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if (dn_type == g_dn_types[i])
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{
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if (dn[i] == NULL)
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{
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dn[i] = tmp;
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found = 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (found == 0) /* not found so get rid of it */
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{
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free(tmp);
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}
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}
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ret = X509_OK;
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end_name:
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* Read the modulus and public exponent of a certificate.
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*/
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static int asn1_public_key(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
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{
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int ret = X509_NOT_OK, mod_len, pub_len;
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uint8_t *modulus, *pub_exp;
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if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
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asn1_skip_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
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asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_BIT_STRING) < 0)
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goto end_pub_key;
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(*offset)++;
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if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
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goto end_pub_key;
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mod_len = asn1_get_int(cert, offset, &modulus);
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pub_len = asn1_get_int(cert, offset, &pub_exp);
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RSA_pub_key_new(&x509_ctx->rsa_ctx, modulus, mod_len, pub_exp, pub_len);
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free(modulus);
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free(pub_exp);
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ret = X509_OK;
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end_pub_key:
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return ret;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
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/**
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* Read the signature of the certificate.
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*/
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static int asn1_signature(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
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{
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int ret = X509_NOT_OK;
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if (cert[(*offset)++] != ASN1_BIT_STRING)
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goto end_sig;
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x509_ctx->sig_len = get_asn1_length(cert, offset);
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x509_ctx->signature = (uint8_t *)malloc(x509_ctx->sig_len);
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memcpy(x509_ctx->signature, &cert[*offset], x509_ctx->sig_len);
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*offset += x509_ctx->sig_len;
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ret = X509_OK;
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end_sig:
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Compare 2 distinguished name components for equality
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* @return 0 if a match
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*/
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static int asn1_compare_dn_comp(const char *dn1, const char *dn2)
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{
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int ret = 1;
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if ((dn1 && dn2 == NULL) || (dn1 == NULL && dn2)) goto err_no_match;
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ret = (dn1 && dn2) ? strcmp(dn1, dn2) : 0;
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err_no_match:
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* Clean up all of the CA certificates.
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*/
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void remove_ca_certs(CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx)
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{
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int i = 0;
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while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
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{
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x509_free(ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]);
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ca_cert_ctx->cert[i++] = NULL;
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}
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free(ca_cert_ctx);
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}
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/*
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* Compare 2 distinguished names for equality
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* @return 0 if a match
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*/
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static int asn1_compare_dn(char * const dn1[], char * const dn2[])
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < X509_NUM_DN_TYPES; i++)
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{
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if (asn1_compare_dn_comp(dn1[i], dn2[i]))
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{
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0; /* all good */
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}
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/**
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* Retrieve the signature from a certificate.
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*/
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const uint8_t *x509_get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len)
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{
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int offset = 0;
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const uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
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if (asn1_next_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
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asn1_skip_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE))
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goto end_get_sig;
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if (asn1_sig[offset++] != ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
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goto end_get_sig;
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*len = get_asn1_length(asn1_sig, &offset);
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ptr = &asn1_sig[offset]; /* all ok */
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end_get_sig:
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return ptr;
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}
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#endif
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/**
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* Read the signature type of the certificate. We only support RSA-MD5 and
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* RSA-SHA1 signature types.
|
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*/
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static int asn1_signature_type(const uint8_t *cert,
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int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
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{
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int ret = X509_NOT_OK, len;
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|
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if (cert[(*offset)++] != ASN1_OID)
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goto end_check_sig;
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len = get_asn1_length(cert, offset);
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if (memcmp(sig_oid_prefix, &cert[*offset], SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE))
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goto end_check_sig; /* unrecognised cert type */
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|
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x509_ctx->sig_type = cert[*offset + SIG_OID_PREFIX_SIZE];
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*offset += len;
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if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_NULL))
|
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goto end_check_sig;
|
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ret = X509_OK;
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|
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end_check_sig:
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return ret;
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}
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|
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/**
|
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* Construct a new x509 object.
|
||||
* @return 0 if ok. < 0 if there was a problem.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int x509_new(const uint8_t *cert, int *len, X509_CTX **ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int begin_tbs, end_tbs;
|
||||
int ret = X509_NOT_OK, offset = 0, cert_size = 0;
|
||||
X509_CTX *x509_ctx;
|
||||
BI_CTX *bi_ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
*ctx = (X509_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(X509_CTX));
|
||||
x509_ctx = *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
/* get the certificate size */
|
||||
asn1_skip_obj(cert, &cert_size, ASN1_SEQUENCE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
|
||||
goto end_cert;
|
||||
|
||||
begin_tbs = offset; /* start of the tbs */
|
||||
end_tbs = begin_tbs; /* work out the end of the tbs */
|
||||
asn1_skip_obj(cert, &end_tbs, ASN1_SEQUENCE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
|
||||
goto end_cert;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cert[offset] == ASN1_EXPLICIT_TAG) /* optional version */
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (asn1_version(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
|
||||
goto end_cert;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_INTEGER) || /* serial number */
|
||||
asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
|
||||
goto end_cert;
|
||||
|
||||
/* make sure the signature is ok */
|
||||
if (asn1_signature_type(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST;
|
||||
goto end_cert;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (asn1_name(cert, &offset, x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn) ||
|
||||
asn1_validity(cert, &offset, x509_ctx) ||
|
||||
asn1_name(cert, &offset, x509_ctx->cert_dn) ||
|
||||
asn1_public_key(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
|
||||
goto end_cert;
|
||||
|
||||
bi_ctx = x509_ctx->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION /* only care if doing verification */
|
||||
/* use the appropriate signature algorithm (either SHA1 or MD5) */
|
||||
if (x509_ctx->sig_type == SIG_TYPE_MD5)
|
||||
{
|
||||
MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
|
||||
uint8_t md5_dgst[MD5_SIZE];
|
||||
MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
|
||||
MD5Update(&md5_ctx, &cert[begin_tbs], end_tbs-begin_tbs);
|
||||
MD5Final(&md5_ctx, md5_dgst);
|
||||
x509_ctx->digest = bi_import(bi_ctx, md5_dgst, MD5_SIZE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (x509_ctx->sig_type == SIG_TYPE_SHA1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
SHA1_CTX sha_ctx;
|
||||
uint8_t sha_dgst[SHA1_SIZE];
|
||||
SHA1Init(&sha_ctx);
|
||||
SHA1Update(&sha_ctx, &cert[begin_tbs], end_tbs-begin_tbs);
|
||||
SHA1Final(&sha_ctx, sha_dgst);
|
||||
x509_ctx->digest = bi_import(bi_ctx, sha_dgst, SHA1_SIZE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
offset = end_tbs; /* skip the v3 data */
|
||||
if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
||||
asn1_signature(cert, &offset, x509_ctx))
|
||||
goto end_cert;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
*len = cert_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = X509_OK;
|
||||
end_cert:
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("Error: Invalid X509 ASN.1 file\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Free an X.509 object's resources.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void x509_free(X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509_CTX *next;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (x509_ctx == NULL) /* if already null, then don't bother */
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < X509_NUM_DN_TYPES; i++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
free(x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn[i]);
|
||||
free(x509_ctx->cert_dn[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
free(x509_ctx->signature);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
|
||||
if (x509_ctx->digest)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bi_free(x509_ctx->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx, x509_ctx->digest);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
RSA_free(x509_ctx->rsa_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
next = x509_ctx->next;
|
||||
free(x509_ctx);
|
||||
x509_free(next); /* clear the chain */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Do some basic checks on the certificate chain.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Certificate verification consists of a number of checks:
|
||||
* - A root certificate exists in the certificate store.
|
||||
* - The date of the certificate is after the start date.
|
||||
* - The date of the certificate is before the finish date.
|
||||
* - The certificate chain is valid.
|
||||
* - That the certificate(s) are not self-signed.
|
||||
* - The signature of the certificate is valid.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = X509_OK, i = 0;
|
||||
bigint *cert_sig;
|
||||
X509_CTX *next_cert = NULL;
|
||||
BI_CTX *ctx;
|
||||
bigint *mod, *expn;
|
||||
struct timeval tv;
|
||||
int match_ca_cert = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cert == NULL || ca_cert_ctx == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT;
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* last cert in the chain - look for a trusted cert */
|
||||
if (cert->next == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn,
|
||||
ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->cert_dn) == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
match_ca_cert = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
i++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
|
||||
{
|
||||
next_cert = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
else /* trusted cert not found */
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT;
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
next_cert = cert->next;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* check the not before date */
|
||||
if (tv.tv_sec < cert->not_before)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID;
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* check the not after date */
|
||||
if (tv.tv_sec > cert->not_after)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED;
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* check the chain integrity */
|
||||
if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, next_cert->cert_dn))
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN;
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* check for self-signing */
|
||||
if (!match_ca_cert && asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn, cert->cert_dn) == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED;
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* check the signature */
|
||||
ctx = cert->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
|
||||
mod = next_cert->rsa_ctx->m;
|
||||
expn = next_cert->rsa_ctx->e;
|
||||
cert_sig = RSA_sign_verify(ctx, cert->signature, cert->sig_len,
|
||||
bi_clone(ctx, mod), bi_clone(ctx, expn));
|
||||
|
||||
if (cert_sig)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = cert->digest ? /* check the signature */
|
||||
bi_compare(cert_sig, cert->digest) :
|
||||
X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST;
|
||||
bi_free(ctx, cert_sig);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
|
||||
goto end_verify;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* go down the certificate chain using recursion. */
|
||||
if (ret == 0 && cert->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, next_cert);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
end_verify:
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined (CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE)
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Used for diagnostics.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void x509_print(CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (cert == NULL)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
printf("---------------- CERT DEBUG ----------------\n");
|
||||
printf("* CA Cert Distinguished Name\n");
|
||||
if (cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME])
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("Common Name (CN):\t%s\n", cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION])
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("Organization (O):\t%s\n", cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE])
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("Organizational Unit (OU): %s\n",
|
||||
cert->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
printf("* Cert Distinguished Name\n");
|
||||
if (cert->cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME])
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("Common Name (CN):\t%s\n", cert->cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION])
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("Organization (O):\t%s\n", cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE])
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("Organizational Unit (OU): %s\n",
|
||||
cert->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_TYPE]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
printf("Not Before:\t\t%s", ctime(&cert->not_before));
|
||||
printf("Not After:\t\t%s", ctime(&cert->not_after));
|
||||
printf("RSA bitsize:\t\t%d\n", cert->rsa_ctx->num_octets*8);
|
||||
printf("Sig Type:\t\t");
|
||||
switch (cert->sig_type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case SIG_TYPE_MD5:
|
||||
printf("MD5\n");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SIG_TYPE_SHA1:
|
||||
printf("SHA1\n");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SIG_TYPE_MD2:
|
||||
printf("MD2\n");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
printf("Unrecognized: %d\n", cert->sig_type);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
printf("Verify:\t\t\t");
|
||||
|
||||
if (ca_cert_ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
x509_display_error(x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, cert));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
print_blob("Signature", cert->signature, cert->sig_len);
|
||||
bi_print("Modulus", cert->rsa_ctx->m);
|
||||
bi_print("Pub Exp", cert->rsa_ctx->e);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (ca_cert_ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
x509_print(ca_cert_ctx, cert->next);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void x509_display_error(int error)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (error)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case X509_NOT_OK:
|
||||
printf("X509 not ok");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT:
|
||||
printf("No trusted cert is available");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
|
||||
printf("Bad signature");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID:
|
||||
printf("Cert is not yet valid");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED:
|
||||
printf("Cert has expired");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED:
|
||||
printf("Cert is self-signed");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN:
|
||||
printf("Chain is invalid (check order of certs)");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST:
|
||||
printf("Unsupported digest");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY:
|
||||
printf("Invalid private key");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE */
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
Reference in New Issue